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High rates of corporate taxation reduce corporate investment and thereby depress local 
wages. Using cross-country data I estimate that a ten percentage point increase in the corporate 
tax rate of high-income countries reduces mean annual gross wages by seven percent. The results 
do not support the common belief that the burden of corporate taxes falls most heavily on skilled 
labor; corporate taxation appears to reduce the wages of low-skill and high-skill workers to the 
same degree. The incidence of the corporate tax in the form of reduced wages suggests that 
taxing labor instead of taxing corporations could be Pareto-improving. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate taxation has long been used in an attempt to increase the progressivity of the 
tax structure and redistribute income, but as the economy becomes more open, the burden of 
these taxes shifts from capital to labor, reducing their progressivity. Thus, taxing corporations 
may create inefficiencies that do not produce the desired redistributive benefits. Reassessing the 
incidence of corporate taxation in an open economy setting is necessary to aid policymakers’ 
decisions in designing tax policy that produces the desired revenue and redistributive properties 
with the smallest possible deadweight loss.  
  It is well-known that those responsible for remitting taxes are not always those who bear 
the burden of the tax. Early economic literature focuses on the incidence of taxes in a closed 
economy, and Harberger (1962) estimates that capital, both corporate and non-corporate, bears 
the entire burden of the corporate tax in a closed economy. He shows that this creates an 
inefficient allocation of capital between the corporate and non-corporate sectors. Most corporate 
capital is owned by the wealthy but some non-corporate capital is owned by the middle class, 
and thus, corporate taxation was initially seen as a way to increase the progressivity of the tax 
system even though the tax was slightly less progressive than originally believed.
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  As trade barriers were removed over time, volumes of trade and capital flows rose, 
requiring a new look at the incidence of taxes-- one that focuses on the impact of openness. 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) demonstrate that in a small open economy, any source-based 
capital tax is inefficient. Their theory predicts that as the economy becomes open, capital 
becomes more mobile, and thus the price of capital is fixed at the world return. Therefore, if a 
country places a tax on capital, capital will flee to obtain the higher after-tax world rate of return. 
Capital will continue to move abroad until the marginal productivity of capital at home is driven   2
up to the point where the after-tax return to capital equals the world return. This decrease in 
capital results in a lower marginal productivity of labor and thereby, if capital is perfectly 
mobile, labor bears the entire burden of a capital tax. Harberger (1995) also revisits the incidence 
of corporate taxation in an open economy finding that the burden of a corporate tax more than 
fully shifts to labor. He estimates that the burden on labor may be 2 to 2.5 times as large as the 
corporate tax revenue raised. As Harberger points out, the openness of a country remains a 
crucial factor in analyzing the incidence of a corporate tax.  
Randolph (2006) and Gravelle and Smetters (2006) both develop general equilibrium 
models in an open economy to examine the incidence of the corporate tax. Randolph finds that 
labor bears 70 percent of the corporate tax in a model in which worldwide capital stock is fixed. 
Gravelle and Smetters similarly assume the capital stock to be fixed and focus on product 
substitutability. They find that labor bears less than 70 percent of the corporate tax if products 
are not perfectly substitutable. Low savings elasticity and the ability of a country to affect world 
prices also reduce labor’s burden in their model. However, by ignoring the effect of corporate 
taxes on the growth of capital, these models likely underestimate the impact of corporate taxes 
on labor.  
While literature in this area has focused heavily on the theoretical side of the issue, this 
paper uses an empirical approach to measure the first-order effect of openness on the incidence 
of corporate taxation by looking at the effect of openness, corporate taxes and their interaction on 
the gross wages of workers. Using cross-country panel data from the Luxembourg Income Study, 
I estimate that a ten percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate decreases annual gross 
wages by seven percent. Using U.S. data on corporate tax revenues and total wages, these 
estimates predict that labor’s burden is more than four times the magnitude of the corporate tax   3
revenue collected in the U.S. While this estimate is nearly twice as large as Harberger’s (1995), 
his estimate that labor bears 2 to 2.5 times the corporate tax revenue cannot be rejected in my 
estimates. In addition, Harberger estimates the burden of the corporate tax on labor but does not 
include an estimate of the deadweight loss associated with the corporate tax.  
Openness, as measured by total trade divided by GDP, also has a negative effect on 
wages; a ten percentage point increase in openness is estimated to decrease annual gross wages 
by four percent. The interaction of corporate tax rates with openness has a positive effect on 
wages in the data. This is consistent with a model in which corporations are better able to avoid 
taxes in more open economies. I examine this theory by comparing the effects of marginal and 
average corporate tax rates on wages. In my data, the difference between marginal and average 
corporate tax rates is positively correlated with openness suggesting that corporations are better 
able to lower their average tax rate in more open economies. Further examination of this theory 
would be an interesting addition to the tax avoidance literature. 
To analyze completely the progressivity of corporate taxes, one must look at the effect of 
corporate taxes across workers of differential skill. There are theoretical reasons to believe that 
the effects of corporate taxation will vary across skill-level. Griliches (1969) finds that capital 
and unskilled labor are more substitutable than capital and skilled labor, creating the capital-skill 
complementarity hypothesis. The capital-skill complementarity hypothesis predicts that the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor is lower than the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and unskilled labor. Bergstrom and Panas (1992) show the 
robustness of this result in an empirical analysis using Swedish manufacturing data. The capital-
skill complementarity hypothesis suggests that the decrease in capital due to an imposition of 
corporate taxes should have a larger effect on skilled labor, as opposed to unskilled labor. Thus,   4
in an open economy, we should expect wages of skilled labor to decrease by more than the 
wages of unskilled labor as a result of higher corporate tax rates. Although wages of all types of 
labor will be depressed by a corporate tax, theory suggests that the burden of corporate taxes is 
borne more heavily by skilled labor especially as the economy becomes more open. 
Past research provides the foundation to analyze the effects of corporate taxes and 
openness on wages across skill-level. I find little evidence, however, that corporate taxes have a 
larger negative effect on wages of skilled labor. In fact, results suggest that corporate taxes have 
similar effects on annual gross wages for all skill groups. Differences in international labor 
mobility may provide one explanation of these results. If high-skill labor is more internationally 
mobile, then they can pass some of the burden of the corporate tax on to less mobile factors. 
These results combined with the sizable inefficiencies created by corporate taxation suggest that 
taxing labor directly may result in a Pareto-improving outcome with the same tax progressivity 
of the current tax system. 
A recent empirical contribution, Hassett and Mathur (2006), also finds that labor more 
than fully bears the burden of corporate taxes in an open economy; they estimate that a one 
percent increase in the corporate tax rate results in a 0.8 to 1.0 percent decrease in the 
manufacturing wage rate. Using U.S. data, their results translate into a burden on labor that is 
approximately five times the magnitude that I find. 
The central motivation of this paper is to estimate the incidence of the corporate tax in an 
open economy. In addition, I analyze these impacts across skill-level and find that openness may 
lead to more active tax avoidance. A closer examination of the economic theory behind the 
incidence of corporate taxes in an open economy follows in Section 2. The data used in the   5
empirical analysis are described in Section 3. Empirical results are analyzed in Section 4; 
conclusion and policy analysis follow in Section 5. 
 
2. Theory 
2.1 The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Wage 
In a closed economy, Harberger (1962) finds that corporate taxes do not affect wages. In 
Harberger’s model, the economy is closed, the quantities of capital and labor are fixed, and 
capital and labor are freely mobile between industries. In this setting, if a source-based corporate 
tax is imposed, the after-tax return to capital in the corporate sector will decrease. Capital will 
move to the non-corporate sector in pursuit of higher returns until the after-tax returns have 
equalized across the corporate and non-corporate sectors. This increase in capital in the non-
corporate sector will decrease the marginal productivity of capital in that sector resulting in a 
lower return. Similarly, as capital leaves the corporate sector the marginal productivity of capital 
in that sector will rise. Labor can move between sectors to ensure that their wages will not 
change due to changes in the amount of capital. Thus, the burden of the corporate tax falls 
entirely on capital in both the corporate and non-corporate sectors.  
There are several lessons to take away from Harberger’s model. First, the mobility of 
factors within a country ensures that the return to a factor must be equal across sectors. Also, 
with a fixed supply of capital and a closed economy, labor bears none of the burden of a source-
based corporate tax. In this model, deadweight loss is created by the inefficient allocation of 
capital between corporate and non-corporate industries. Harberger estimates a deadweight loss of 
only eight percent of corporate revenue. Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1993) add product 
differentiation to the closed economy model and find that capital still bears the complete burden   6
of the tax. They estimate, however, that the deadweight loss created by corporate taxes is more 
than 100 percent of corporate tax revenue. 
 
2.2 The Effect of Openness on Wages 
  Labor and international trade economists have devoted much energy and research to 
understanding the effect of economic openness on wages. Using the fundamentals they have 
developed will allow me to integrate the effect of openness on wages with the incidence of 
corporate taxation. The Hecksher-Ohlin model predicts that countries will tend to export goods 
and services whose production uses relatively intensely their comparatively abundant factor. 
Most developed countries have a relatively large endowment of capital compared to the rest of 
the world; therefore, the comparative advantage of most developed countries lies in capital 
intensive goods and services.
2 Thus, as the economy opens, these countries will shift production 
toward capital intensive industries. Factor price equalization predicts under strong assumptions 
that wages and the return to capital will equalize across countries over time with free trade. This 
result requires countries to possess identical technology and assumes that capital and labor are 
mobile within country but immobile between countries.
3 In addition, capital to labor ratios must 
be sufficiently similar across countries so that all countries will produce tradable goods 
employing both factors (i.e., production occurs in the cone of diversification). If factor price 
equalization or the weaker condition of factor price convergence holds, wages will fall in 
developed countries as more emphasis is put on capital-intensive industries. In my model, capital 
is internationally mobile; this assumption guarantees that every country will be in the cone of 
diversification if there are no impediments to trade, and thus, factor price equalization will hold. 
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2.3 The Effect of Openness on the Incidence of Corporate Taxes 
In today’s global economy, not only are goods and services traded among countries, but 
capital is also mobile. Capital mobility assures that the return to capital will be equal across 
countries. Therefore, if a tax on capital is levied in a single small country, it can not affect the 
worldwide return to capital. This can be seen in equation (1) where r* is defined as the world 
rate of return on capital.   
  (1 ) K MPK r τ
∗ − =  (1) 
If the tax on capital (τk) is increased, the marginal productivity of capital (MPK) must increase in 
order to keep the return to capital set at the world price. This occurs as capital flees the home 
country in pursuit of a higher return; the decrease in capital will increase the marginal 
productivity of capital in the home country and investors will continue to pursue outside 
opportunities until the marginal productivity of capital has increased to the point where equation 
(1) holds. As producers in the home country use less capital, the marginal productivity of labor 
will decline resulting in lower wages at home. Thus, a tax on capital is borne entirely by labor in 
a small open economy, and we would expect the corporate tax rate to have a negative effect on 
wages.
4  
 Harberger  (1995)  reevaluates  the incidence of the corporate tax by assessing the burden 
of the tax in an open economy. Not only does Harberger find a negative effect of corporate taxes 
on wages, but he also finds that labor’s burden from corporate taxation is 2 to 2.5 times as large 
as corporate tax revenue. In an open economy, there are more opportunities for inefficiencies to 
occur as a result of source-based corporate taxes. As in the closed economy, capital may be 
inefficiently allocated between the corporate and non-corporate sector within a country; in 
addition, capital may now be inefficiently allocated across countries. In an open economy,   8
corporations may alter their business decisions in order to minimize their tax burden causing 
further inefficiencies within individual corporations. 
 
2.4 Tax Incidence across Skill-Level 
If the burden of a corporate tax is expected to fall on labor, it is important to understand 
the differential impact across skill. The principal mechanism by which labor bears the burden of 
the corporate tax is via decreased marginal productivity of labor due to capital flight. By 
determining how decreased capital differentially impacts labor productivity across skill, we can 
understand its effect on wages. The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor plays a 
key role in determining the impact of decreasing capital on wages. If the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor and labor’s share of output is constant across skill, then any change in 
capital should not differentially impact wages across skill.  
Griliches (1969) estimates that capital is more complementary with skilled labor relative 
to unskilled labor. This finding is known as the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis. 
Bergstrom and Panas (1992) use 12 different models to show that this hypothesis holds in 92 
percent of cases. If capital and skill are relatively more complementary, we should expect that 
any change in capital will have the largest impact on skilled labor. In a small open economy, 
theory tells us that the burden of a capital tax falls on labor because corporate taxation leads to a 
decrease in capital in the home country. Combining this theory with the capital-skill 
complementarity hypothesis, the burden of a corporate tax should be heaviest on high-skill labor 
since lower levels of capital will have the largest negative effect on this group.  
This result can also be seen in a model. To choose the appropriate production function, I 
refer to a large body of economic literature estimating the elasticity of substitution between   9
various types of labor and capital. In order to allow for different elasticities of substitution 
between types of labor and capital, I use a nested CES production function. I follow the direction 
of Fallon and Layard (1975) who find that equation (2) is the most accurate specification for a 
two-level nested CES production function where L1 is skilled-labor and L2 is unskilled labor. 
The production function in equation (2) assumes that the elasticity of substitution between 
capital (K) and unskilled labor (L2) is equal to the elasticity of substitution between skilled (L1) 
and unskilled labor. This elasticity of substitution is defined as 1/ (1-ρ). The elasticity of 
substitution between skilled labor and capital is defined as 1/ (1- θ). If ρ > θ, then skilled labor is 
more complementary with capital than unskilled labor.  
  {}
1/ /
12 (1 ) (1 ) , , 1 QA a b K b L a L
ρ ρθ θθ ρθρ ⎡⎤ =+ − + − ≤ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 (2) 
  In order to coincide with my data, I augment this production function in order to allow 
three types of labor: high-skill, medium-skill, and low-skill, as seen in equation (3). I assume that 
L1 is high-skill labor, L2 is middle-skill labor and L3 is low-skill labor because past literature 
suggests that this specification most accurately describes the data. However, this assumption is 
not needed for the results to hold. High-skill labor is the most complementary with capital, 
followed by middle-skill if β > γ > θ. However, this production function does not assume that L1 
is most complementary with capital; this is determined by the values of β, γ, and θ. The function 
does assume that the elasticity of substitution between K and L2 is equal to the elasticity of 
substitution between L1 and L2. 
 
1
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  If all types of labor have the same elasticity of substitution with capital (i.e. β = γ = θ) 
and the supply of all types of labor is fixed, then the burden of the corporate tax across skill-level 
will be constant.  If, however, the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis is correct and 
β > γ > θ, then the ratio of high-skill wages to middle-skill wages increases with capital and the 
ratio of middle-skill wages to low-skill wages increases with capital. These results are derived in 
Appendix A.  
 
3. Empirical Set-Up and Data 
  In order to test empirically the impact of openness on the incidence of corporate taxation, 
we must first determine the variables that affect the gross wage of an individual. In a simple 
model, we expect that both individual characteristics (I) and country characteristics (C) impact 
individual wages. In the specification below, gross wage represents the mean annual gross wage 
of individuals of skill-level (s) in a given country (j) and year (t). 
  ln( ) jts jts jt jts gross wage I C α βγε = +++  (4)   
  Education level is the primary individual characteristic of interest. Mincer (1984) 
develops the standard human capital earnings function; he formulates that an individual’s wage 
is a function of years of schooling, experience, and experience squared. This formulation has 
been empirically tested many times resulting in positive coefficients on years of schooling and 
experience and a negative coefficient on experience squared.
5 Gender is also likely to affect 
wages and is often included as an independent variable. However, gender is often combined with 
labor supply considerations because women’s labor supply often varies over time.
6 
  The country characteristics of interest include the corporate tax rate, openness and the 
interaction of the corporate tax rate with openness. I also include GDP per capita to control for   11
country-level omitted variables that may be correlated with the residual. All of my estimations 
include random effects and cluster the standard errors at the country level. Using random effects 
allows me to look at the effects between countries in addition to over time. Several countries in 
my data include only one year of data making fixed effects an unattractive alternative to random 
effects. 
 
3.1 Luxembourg Income Study 
  The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is a panel database covering 30 countries over 5 
waves of data from 1979 – 2002.
7 The LIS compiles data from country specific household 
income surveys. For example, individual data for the United States is taken from the Current 
Population Survey. The dataset includes individual and household data on demographics, 
expenditure, income, labor market outcomes and tax variables. This dataset is a rich source of 
data that has been underutilized in economic literature.  
The LIS database does, however, have some limitations. Not all of the variables are 
available in all of the countries and years. Second, and more problematic, many variables are not 
defined consistently across countries. For example, the United States’ education variable records 
years of education, while Canada’s education variable records levels (i.e., graduated high school, 
university degree …) of education. The LIS does provide a recoding of the education variable for 
many countries that helps circumvent this problem. Third, income variables are generally 
available as net or gross income but not both.   
  The LIS education recode program groups each individual’s education into one of three 
categories: low, middle or high. High education includes those with a college degree and above. 
Middle education includes those with a high school degree but not a college degree. Low   12
education ranges from no education to some education not including a high school degree. The 
education recoding uses the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education from the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the LIS believes this recode to 
produce an education variable that is as comparable across countries as possible. For this paper, I 
only include countries for which a reclassification is available; some countries were not able to 
be recoded.
8  
In the LIS data, each country/year observation is a separate dataset; thus, to avoid 
possible inconsistencies between countries I do not merge the datasets. Therefore, for each 
country/year observation, I sort individuals by education level; each observation in my dataset is 
a specific country, year and education level. Any individual characteristics, therefore, are the 
mean value of that characteristic across education level within a given country and year. 
  For each observation, I am interested in the mean annual gross wage of individuals within 
skill.
9 Unfortunately, gross income is only available for approximately half of the countries; the 
remaining countries have income provided as net. In order to maintain a sample size large 
enough for statistical inference, I transform the average net income by education level into 
average gross income by education level using each country’s tax code for the specified year.
10 I 
obtain countries’ tax codes from Individual Taxes: A Worldwide Summary. My calculation takes 
into account national income tax, local income tax, and the employees’ contribution to social 
security. Table 1 lists the countries and years included in my data and indicates those countries 
for which net income has been transformed into gross income.
11 Figure 1 shows the average 
gross wage by education level for France, Denmark and Greece. As expected, higher levels of 
education always result in a higher wage. Gross wages by education, marginal corporate tax rates 
and openness measures for all countries in 1994/1995 are displayed in Figure 2.   13
 
3.2 Measures of Openness 
  Openness is a variable that can be approximated in several ways, and in the current 
literature, several approximations are used. Therefore, I will look at three different measures of 
openness. The first is the ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to gross domestic product and 
is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The second measure I 
consider is the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index. The Chinn-Ito Index measures capital 
account openness and provides data for 163 countries from 1970 to 2004. The Chinn-Ito Index is 
calculated using restrictions on cross-border financial transactions that are available from the 
International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. The third measure used is the Economic Globalisation Index provided by the Centre 
for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick. This index is 
calculated using data on trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and income from 
foreign workers, foreign assets, expatriates and foreign-owned domestic assets. The primary 
estimates in this paper will include openness as measured by total trade divided by GDP. 
However, tables providing estimates using the other two measures of openness are available in 
Appendix B. 
 
3.3 Corporate Tax Rates and Country-level Data 
  The key variable of interest in this paper is the corporate tax rate. Each country’s highest 
marginal corporate tax rate is available from the World Tax Database provided by the Office of 
Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan. For most countries, corporate tax rates 
tended to fall from 1979 to 2000. Switzerland has the lowest corporate tax rate at 9.8 percent in   14
1992; Germany has the highest marginal corporate tax rate at 56 percent in 1984 and 1989. The 
mean, marginal corporate tax rate in my dataset is 36 percent. For comparison, I also use the 
average corporate tax rate in some estimations. These data are obtained from the Statistics of 
Income Bulletin and are calculated by dividing the taxable foreign earned income by the foreign 
taxes paid by U.S. multinational firms in a foreign country. The average corporate tax rate may 
be a more reliable measure of cross-country differences in tax rates because it accounts for 
differences in taxable income, credits and depreciation allowances. 
Additional data obtained from the LIS include gender and age; each variable is entered as 
the average value by education level. Age is included in my regressions as a proxy for 
experience. The number of years of education is not available for most individuals, and thus, a 
more precise measure of experience is not possible. GDP per capita, value added in industry per 
worker and the consumer price index are obtained from the World Development Indicators. All 
monetary values are represented in real U.S. dollars (2000 base year). These values have been 
calculated using exchange rates and the GDP deflator available from the World Development 
Indictors. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Corporate Taxes and Openness 
Openness and the corporate tax rate are the two main country characteristics of interest 
for this paper. In Section 2 we established that the corporate tax rate should have a negative 
impact on the gross wage of workers. The effect of openness is harder to predict ex-ante; the 
countries in the dataset are developed countries that are relatively capital-intensive. Thus, as the 
economy opens, wages for labor should fall. Table 3 shows the estimated effect of corporate   15
taxes and openness on annual gross wage. All regressions in this paper include random effects, 
and the standard errors are clustered at the country level. Dummy variables for low and middle 
education levels are included to measure the return to education. The year is entered as a linear 
trend; this assumption is made because entering the years as dummy variables would cost many 
degrees of freedom in an already small sample. In addition, there are several countries for which 
I have only one year of available data. Table 3 estimates that a one percentage point increase in 
the corporate tax rate results in a 0.5 – 0.7 percent decrease in gross annual wages. In these 
specifications, however, the coefficient on corporate taxes is not statistically significant. 
Openness, as measured by total trade divided by GDP, also has a negative impact on wages; a 
one percentage point increase in openness results in a 0.23 – 0.48 percent decrease in gross 
wages. Openness is statistically significant in both specifications for which it is included. 
As expected, there are positive returns to education; the estimates predict that an 
individual with a low level of education will earn approximately 70 percent less than an 
individual with a high level of education. Individuals with a middle education are estimated to 
earn approximately 30 percent less than those with a high level of education. These findings are 
statistically significant and remain consistent throughout the results. The individual 
characteristics of age, age-squared and male are not statistically significant. This is not surprising 
since these variables are measuring the mean value within an education group, and there is little 
variation in these measures across skill level. In column III, a ten percentage point increase in the 
marginal personal income tax rate is predicted to increase annual gross wages by 7.4 percent. 
This positive coefficient may indicate that labor does not bear the full burden of the personal 
income tax. However, this result should be interpreted with caution as the marginal personal tax 
rate is used to transform net wages into gross wages for approximately half of the observations.   16
  Hassett and Mathur (2006) have recently estimated the effect of corporate taxes on gross 
wage rates in manufacturing industries. They find that a one percent increase in the corporate tax 
rate results in a 0.84 to 1.19 percent decrease in wage rates. As a robustness check of my results, 
I use my data to run the specifications used in Hassett and Mathur (2006). These results are 
presented in Table 4. Looking at column II, a one percent increase in the corporate tax rate is 
shown to decrease hourly wage rates by 0.43 percent.
12 The 95 percent confidence interval of 
this result falls entirely below the findings of Hassett and Mathur. In addition, my sample 
includes only OECD countries in which Hassett and Mathur find wages to be more correlated 
with corporate tax rates. My estimate of 0.43, therefore, should represent the upper-bound of 
their specification. This specification includes value added per worker in manufacturing. In a 
perfectly competitive model, we expect the marginal value added per worker to be equal to the 
wage rate. So, as expected, the correlation between wage rates and value added per worker is 
high. The predicted impact of the corporate tax rate on wages comes via a decrease in the 
marginal productivity of labor; thus, including value added per worker as an explanatory variable 
seems to give a coefficient on the corporate tax rate that is difficult to interpret. 
 
4.2 The Interaction of Tax and Openness 
As shown in Section 2, theory predicts that openness should have a large, negative impact 
on labor’s burden from corporate taxation. Table 5 displays the empirical estimates with the 
added interaction between openness and the corporate tax rate.
13 Including this interaction term 
generates several interesting results.
14 First, the effect of the corporate tax rate on annual gross 
wages is similar to the results found in Table 3. However, the coefficients are now larger in   17
magnitude, statistically significant and predict that a one percentage point increase in the 
corporate tax rate will result in a 0.7 – 1.2 percent decrease in annual gross wages.   
GDP per capita is included in column I in order to control for country level omitted 
variables that may impact gross wages. When GDP per capita is excluded from the specification 
as in column III the majority of the explanatory power of the regression is gone. In addition, the 
absolute value of the coefficient on the marginal corporate tax rate is larger when GDP per capita 
is not included in the regression. Thus, there must be a negative correlation between the marginal 
corporate tax rate and GDP per capita. 
Perhaps the most interesting result is the significant, positive coefficient on the 
interaction of openness and corporate tax rates. Theory predicts that this coefficient should be 
negative. There are several explanations, however, that may explain the positive coefficient. 
First, all of the countries in my data are considered to be open economies by the Sachs-Warner 
openness index in the years used.
15 It is likely that having an open economy shifts the burden of 
the corporate tax from capital to labor but the degree to which a country is open does not have an 
impact. This would result in a coefficient close to zero. So why could the coefficient on the 
interaction term be positive? It may be that as an economy becomes more open, corporations are 
better able to avoid taxes. There is a large literature discussing the degree to which corporations 
actively avoid taxes by transfer pricing, debt/equity reallocation, and placement of branches.
16 
Thus, it seems plausible that an increase in openness could result in an increase in the availability 
of practices that aid tax avoidance. 
  If it is true that as the economy becomes more open, corporations are more likely to avoid 
corporate taxes, then we would expect the average corporate tax rate to account for this 
avoidance. The average corporate tax rate is calculated by dividing the total foreign earned   18
taxable income by the foreign corporate taxes paid by U.S. multinational corporations as 
reported to the IRS. Thus, the average tax rate includes deductions, credits, tax avoidance 
activity, and any differences between the U.S. definition of taxable income and the foreign 
country definition. Table 6 uses the specification found in Table 5 and replaces the marginal 
corporate tax rate with the average corporate tax rate. 
  In Table 6, the interaction term between corporate tax rates and openness is no longer 
significant, as expected. In addition, Figure 3 shows that the difference between the marginal and 
average tax rate is positively correlated with openness. This is another indication that 
corporations may more actively avoid taxes in more open economies. The average corporate tax 
rate has a negative impact on annual gross wages, and the magnitude of this effect is similar to 
the effects using the marginal corporate tax rate. Results in Table 6 are noticeably more 
statistically significant, which may be an indication that the average tax rate is a more precise 
measure of the actual corporate tax rate. 
  
4.3 By Skill-Level 
The results so far have shown that labor bears at least some burden of the corporate tax. 
The next logical step is to ask: how is the burden divided among different types of labor? In 
Section 2, the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis suggested that the burden of the 
corporate tax should fall most heavily on high-skill labor. Table 7 gives the results of regressing 
annual gross wage on corporate tax rates, openness and their interaction separately for each level 
of skill. The coefficients on these three variables are notably consistent between middle-skill and 
high-skill labor. The results in Table 7 do not lend support to the hypothesis that changes to the 
corporate tax rate have a larger impact on high-skill labor. In fact, a one percentage point   19
increase in the corporate tax rate is estimated to decrease the wage of low-education labor by 
0.91 percent, middle-education labor by 0.27 percent and high-education labor by 0.22 percent.  
The inconclusive nature of the results in Table 7 suggests that we should look at similar 
results using the average corporate tax rate. These results are shown in Table 8. The coefficients 
on the average corporate tax rate are strikingly consistent across skill-level with a one percentage 
point increase in the average corporate tax rate predicted to decrease wages by 0.85 – 1.05 
percent. Thus, the results do not provide support for the theory that the burden of the corporate 
tax falls more heavily on highly-skilled labor. 
Next, I use individual data available within a country/year dataset to regress individual 
wage rates on education, age, age-squared and male. I run individual regressions for each 
country/year dataset that provides wage rates. For each country/year I use two measures of 
education: one including dummies for middle education and high education and another 
including an overall education variable valued at one for low, two for middle and three for high 
education. Table 9 reports the coefficients on middle and high education taken from one 
regression and the coefficient on overall education taken from the other for each country/year 
observation. These coefficients represent the return to education in a given country. The 
marginal and average corporate tax rates are listed in order to compare the tax rate with the 
return to education. Figure 4 plots the return to high education (above low) with the marginal 
corporate tax rate. This figure shows some evidence that the return to education is negatively 
impacted by the marginal corporate tax rate. Figure 5 plots the return to high education (above 
low) with the average corporate tax rate. This figure does not show any evidence of decreasing 
returns to education in response to corporate tax rates. Using the data in Table 9, I regress the 
return to education (middle, high, overall) on the average corporate tax rate, openness and their   20
interaction. These results are reported in Table 10 and find mild evidence that the average 
corporate tax rate affects the return to education. It is estimated that a one percentage point 
increase in the average corporate tax rate decreases the return to a high level of education (over 
low) by 0.44 percentage points. 
The results presented here show little evidence that the burden of the corporate tax 
increases with skill-level. This contradicts the predictions drawn from the capital-skill 
complementarity hypothesis. One possible explanation is differences in labor mobility across 
skill-level. If high-skill workers are more mobile than low-skill workers, they may be able to 
avoid some of the corporate tax burden. These results combined with the substantial shifting of 
the corporate tax burden from capital to labor suggest that the incidence of the corporate tax is 
much less progressive than originally believed. 
 
4.4 The Magnitude of Labor’s Burden 
Estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in the average corporate tax rate, 
decreases annual gross wages by .9 percent. What does this imply about labor’s burden of the 
corporate income tax? In 2000, the U.S. collected 207 billion dollars in corporate income tax 
revenue.
17 If the U.S. increases the average corporate tax rate from 20 percent to 21 percent and 
the tax base remains constant, corporate tax revenues should increase by 10.4 billion dollars. 
Total wages in the U.S. in 2000 were 4.8 trillion dollars; a 0.9 percent fall in total wages 
decreases wages by 43.5 billion dollars.
18 These data suggest that the marginal burden on labor 
of a one percentage point increase in the corporate income tax rate is 4.2 times the additional 
corporate tax revenue collected. Although this burden seems large, Harberger’s (1995) estimate 
of labor’s burden cannot be rejected in my results. The 95 percent confidence interval for   21
average corporate tax rates suggests that the marginal burden of the corporate tax falls between 
2.35 and 6.2 times the tax revenue collected. 
Harberger’s finding that labor’s burden of the corporate tax may be 2 to 2.5 times the size 
of corporate tax revenue collected reflects only labor’s burden of the tax and does not include 
any burden from inefficiencies created by the tax. There are four potential margins from which 
distortions may occur from imposing a corporate tax. A corporate tax creates an inefficient 
allocation of capital between corporate and non-corporate firms within a country as Harberger 
(1962) found in a closed economy model. An open economy creates an additional distortion of 
capital allocation among countries. Corporate taxes create incentives for corporations to change 
their behavior in order to avoid taxes; these changes may create inefficiencies. If the corporate 
tax reduces wages and thereby reduces the return to skill, the corporate tax may create 
inefficiencies by distorting the acquisition of education. The estimated large burden of the 
corporate tax on labor is a good indication that the inefficiencies created by taxing corporations 
in an open economy are substantial. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The empirical results presented here suggest that the incidence of corporate taxation is 
more than fully borne by labor. I estimate that a one percentage point increase in the marginal 
corporate tax rate decreases annual wages by 0.7 percent. The magnitude of the results predicts 
that the decrease in wages is more than four times the amount of the corporate tax revenue 
collected. These empirical estimates cannot reject Harberger’s (1995) theoretical estimate that 
labor bears 2 to 2.5 times the amount of corporate revenue collected. The inefficiencies created   22
by the corporate income tax suggest that the cost of raising revenue via a corporate tax may be 
more costly and cause more distortions in the economy than a tax on labor income. 
The burden of the corporate tax on wages is shared equally across skill-level, suggesting 
that the corporate tax may not be as progressive as many politicians assume. Also, as the 
economy becomes more global, raising the corporate tax may result in lower than predicted 
corporate revenue increases due to the ability of firms to avoid taxes more effectively. This paper 
provides empirical evidence that labor’s burden of corporate taxes is large as Harberger (1995) 
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1 Auerbach (2005) 
2 Jones and Kenen (1984) 
3 Johnson and Stafford (1999) 
4 Theory predicts that corporate tax rates will have a negative effect on wage rates in an open economy. In this 
paper, I look at the effect of corporate tax rates on annual gross wages because of data availability. If labor is 
perfectly inelastic, then the effect of the corporate tax rate will be exactly the same on wage rates and annual wages. 
However, if labor is not perfectly inelastic, then corporate tax rates may have an impact on both wage rates and the 
amount of labor employed. Thus, the effect of corporate taxes on annual wages should be weakly larger than the 
effect on wage rates. 
5 A good review of the returns to education and the human capital earnings function can be found in Card (1999). 
6 Card (1999) 
7 The Luxembourg Income Study is currently reviewing a sixth wave of data for many countries extending the data 
to 2005. 
8 An education recode is not available for the following countries: Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel and 
United Kingdom. An education recode is not available in the early years for the following countries: Australia, 
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
9  I look at the effect of corporate taxes on the annual gross income of individuals as opposed to the wage rate of 
individuals. Data on individual wage rates is available from the LIS but several problems exist with this data. First, 
some countries ask individuals directly for wage rates; the accuracy of this information is questionable. More 
problematic is that some countries have constructed the wage rate variable from measures of annual income and 
hours worked. These data were constructed from either net or gross incomes, whichever is available for a specific 
country. Because my results are specifically concerned with the effects of taxes on wages, the measure of wage rates 
in the LIS data is not well-suited for my purposes.  
10 These conversions may produce a wage distribution that is more equal than the actual wage distribution. In 
calculating gross wages, I use the individual tax rate appropriate for the mean wage within a skill level. Therefore, 
high income individuals may face a higher tax rate than I use in this calculation. This will be more problematic for 
countries that have a highly progressive individual income tax regime.    24
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Mexico, Poland and the Slovak Republic have gross wages that are outliers. These country observations do not 
affect the results in this paper. 
12 In these results, I have used hourly wage rates to keep my specification as close to Hassett and Mathur’s 
specification as possible. However, using annual gross wages in column II provides similar results. 
13 The interaction term has been entered as (openness - mean openness) multiplied by the corporate tax rate. Thus, 
the coefficients on the corporate tax rate are accurate as displayed in the table. 
14 The results presented in Table 5 and Table 6 are almost identical to results with a dependent variable of ln(wages) 
– ln(gdp per capita). For example, the coefficient on the marginal corporate tax rate is -.7356 with the ratio as the 
dependent variable and -.7136 with ln(wages) as the dependent variable. The coefficient on openness remains 
significant and negative; the coefficient on the interaction term remains significant and positive in the regressions 
using the marginal corporate tax rate. The coefficient on the average corporate tax rate is -.935 using the ratio as the 
dependent variable and -.924 using ln(wages). The interaction term is insignificant. 
15 The one exception is Mexico in 1984. 
16 For an extensive look at tax avoidance and evasion, see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). 
17 Data obtained from the World Tax Database. 
18 Total wages were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.   25
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Belgium: 1985*, 1988*, 1992, 1995*, 1997, 2000*
Denmark: 1987, 1992
Finland: 1995, 2000
France: 1984*, 1989*, 1994*
Germany: 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000
Greece: 1995*, 2000*
Ireland: 1994*, 1995*, 1996*, 2000*
Italy: 1986*, 1987*, 1989*, 1991*, 1993*, 1995*, 1998*, 2000*
Mexico: 1984*, 1989*, 1992*, 1994*, 1996*, 1998*, 2000*
Netherlands: 1983, 1991, 1994, 1999
Norway: 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000
Poland: 1995*
Slovak Republic: 1992
Spain: 1990*, 1995*, 2000*
Sweden: 1992, 1995, 2000
Switzerland: 1992
United States: 1979, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000
* Net incomes were converted into gross incomes.
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Figure 2: Gross Wages, Marginal Corporate Tax Rates and Openness Measures 
 from 1994/1995 
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Mean Std. Deviation Observations
Gross Wage: Low Education 17,984.30 7424.78 67
Gross Wage: Middle Education 22,699.91 8685.39 67
Gross Wage: High Education 32,490.36 12770.67 67
Marginal Corporate Tax Rate 36.55% 0.0738 67
Average Corporate Tax Rate 26.83% 0.117 59
Openness: (Exports + Imports)/GDP 0.77 0.5058 67
Openness: Economic Globalisation Index 0.23 0.125 63
Openness: Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index 1.67 1.18 58
GDP per Capita 19,222.44 8697.89 67
Unemployment Rate 8.14% 4.22 64
Personal Tax Rate 31.13% 12.49 165
Value-Added per Worker 10,415.64 4896.34 62
Consumer Price Index 80.36 21.66 65
Year 1993.37 5.19 67
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(I) (II) (III)
Marg. Corporate Tax Rate -0.5499 -0.5027 -0.7063
(.763) (.677) (.674)
Openness -0.4777 *** -0.2314 ***
(.133) (.083)
Low Education -0.7169 *** -0.7260 *** -0.6550 ***
(.160) (.163) (.179)
Middle Education -0.3399 *** -0.3342 *** -0.2882 ***
(.032) (.033) (.044)
Age 0.0324 0.0389 0.2325
(.337) (.339) (.365)
Age-Squared 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0023
(.004) (.004) (.0048)
Male 0.2240 0.1642 -0.2073
(.173) (.196) (.264)
Ln(GDP per Capita) 0.9570 *** 0.9330 *** 0.5510 ***
(.122) (.114) (.123)
Personal Tax Rate 0.7357 *
(.452)
Year -0.0200 *** -0.0139 *** -0.0170 ***
(.004) (.004) (.005)
Constant 39.6338 *** 27.9270 *** 33.7570 ***
(10.422) (9.707) (10.37)
R-Squared 0.8307 0.7292 0.7668
N 195 195 159
Notes: All regressions include random effects and standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.
Table 3: The Effect of Corporate Tax Rates and Openness
on Ln(Annual Gross Wage)
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(I) (II) (III)
Ln(Corporate Tax Rate) -0.4336 ** -0.4327 ** -0.4978
(.200) (.201) (.797)
Ln(Openness) -0.3258 * 0.0391
(.196) (.205)
Ln(Value Added per Worker) 0.9187 *** 0.9647 *** 0.9263 ***
(.207) (.23) (.219)
Ln(CPI) 0.1113 *** 0.1472 *** 0.1766 **
(.036) (.044) (.085)
Personal Tax Rate 0.0659
(.215)
Year -0.0007 0.0055 -0.0084
(.010) (.008) (.012)
Low Education -0.6773 *** -0.6773 *** -0.6721 ***
(.142) (.143) (.130)
Middle Education -0.3576 *** -0.3576 *** -0.3522 ***
(.039) (.039) (.038)
Constant -5.4052 -18.6350 9.6036
(20.633) (15.231) (23.450)
R-Squared 0.8293 0.7715 0.8368
N 108 108 96
Notes: All regressions include random effects and standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Ln(Hourly Wage Rate in US $)
Table 4: Comparison to Hassett and Mathur (2006)
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(I) (II) (III)
Marginal Corporate Tax Rate -0.7136 ** -1.1317 ** -1.2308 **
(.364) (.518) (.500)
Openness -1.3769 *** -1.0543 ** -1.2622 ***
(.384) (.461) (.295)
(Open-mean open)*Corp. Tax 2.6970 ** 2.4013 * 0.3481
(1.06) (1.381) (1.10)
Low Education -0.7421 *** -0.6915 *** -0.8007 ***
(.164) (.196) (.160)
Middle Education -0.3398 *** -0.2935 *** -0.3273 ***
(.039) (.051) (.038)
Age -0.0915 0.1040 -0.2033
(.397) (.440) (.358)
Age-Squared 0.0018 -0.0006 0.0035
(.005) (.006) (.005)
Male 0.1072 -0.2515 0.0417
(.192) (.272) (.248)
Ln(GDP per Capita) 0.9894 *** 0.6137 ***
(.107) (.126)
Personal Tax Rate 0.4993
(.4078)
Year -0.0177 *** -0.0207 *** 0.0069
(.004) (.005) (.005)
Constant 37.8650 *** 43.6425 *** 0.1608
(12.105) (14.277) (13.952)
R-Squared 0.7707 0.7877 0.0407
N 195 159 195
Notes:  All regressions include random effects and standard errors are clustered at the country
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 5: The Effect of the Corporate Tax Rate Interacted
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(I) (II)
Avg. Corporate Tax Rate -0.9235 *** -1.0346 ***
(.212) (.228)
Openness -0.4411 ** -0.4347 **
(.211) (.216)
(Open-mean open)*Corp. Tax 0.0213 -0.0991
(.542) (.583)
Low Education -0.7178 *** -0.6642 ***
(.199) (.216)








Ln(GDP per Capita) 0.7749 0.7265 ***
(.125) (.128)
Personal Tax Rate 0.5553
(.392)
Year -0.0184 *** -0.0238 ***
(.006) (.006)




Notes: All regressions include random effects and standard errors are
clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 6: The Effect of the Average Corporate Tax Rate
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Low Education Middle Education High Education
Marginal Corporate Tax Rate -0.9128 ** -0.267 -0.2206
(.456) (.393) (.349)
Openness -1.1983 *** -1.1563 *** -1.269 ***
(.387) (.408) (.385)
(Openness- mean open)*Corp Tax 2.0026 * 2.463 *** 2.6537 **
(1.068) (.957) (1.139)
Age 0.5814 0.5218 0.6236
(.601) (.542) (.388)
Age-Squared -0.0068 -0.0077 -0.0085
(.008) (.007) (.005)
Male 0.4785 0.3035 0.8928 ***
(.3896) (.493) (.301)
GDP per Capita 1.0908 *** 1.1114 *** 0.9977 ***
(.116) (.104) (.108)
Year -0.0218 *** -0.0117 ** 0.0043
(.005) (.005) (.007)
Constant 31.613 ** 14.9796 -18.561
(12.484) (15.293) (18.39)
R-Squared 0.7602 0.8447 0.7864
N6 5 6 5 6 5
Notes: All regressions include random effects and standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 7: The Effects of the Marginal Corporate Tax Rate, Openness, and Their Interaction
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Low Education Middle Education High Education
Average Corporate Tax Rate -0.8522 *** -0.8560 *** -1.0517 ***
(.202) (.203) (.232)
Openness -0.8313 *** -0.5169 ** -0.1189
(.221) (.254) (.166)
(Openness- mean open)*Corp Tax 0.1861 0.1895 -0.2196
(.563) (.586) (.511)
Age 0.6790 0.6821 0.8221 **
(.614) (.439) (.333)
Age-Squared -0.0084 -0.0091 -0.0108 **
(.008) (.006) (.004)
Male 1.0062 *** -0.6062 0.4129
(.3251) (.747) (.335)
GDP per Capita 1.2582 *** 0.8855 *** 0.7331 ***
(.253) (.144) (.095)
Year -0.0192 *** -0.0206 *** -0.0073
(.006) (.007) (.008)
Constant 22.8936 ** 31.2044 *** 2.8470
(10.497) (12.201) (18.202)
R-Squared 0.7740 0.7928 0.7732
N5 7 5 7 5 7
Notes: All regressions include random effects and standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 8: The Effects of the Average Corporate Tax Rate, Openness, and Their Interaction
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Middle High Overall




b Marg. Corp. Tax Avg. Corp. tax
Austria 1994 0.2856 0.5605 0.2813 0.34 0.255
1997 0.2090 0.5342 0.2587 0.34 0.234
2000 0.2870 0.4388 0.2205 0.34 0.189
Belgium 1995 0.0958 0.3137 0.1630 0.39 0.198
1997 0.1942 0.5685 0.2913 0.39 0.162
2000 0.1424 0.3154 0.1600 0.39 0.205
France 1994 0.1694 0.5458 0.2617 0.50 0.510
Germany 1984 0.1562 0.3954 0.1943 0.56 0.470
1989 0.1432 0.3991 0.1965 0.56 0.358
1994 0.0269 0.2702 0.1558 0.45 0.280
2000 0.1560 0.4089 0.2198 0.45 0.257
Greece 1995 0.3387 0.5819 0.2923 0.35 0.320
2000 0.3868 0.7188 0.3601 0.40 0.532
Ireland 1994 0.2940 0.6967 0.3445 0.40 0.087
1995 0.3251 0.6520 0.3259 0.40 0.087
1996 0.3040 0.6944 0.3443 0.40 0.078
2000 0.2565 0.5661 0.2819 0.24 0.094
Italy 1987 0.3152 0.6531 0.3239 0.36 0.373
1989 0.2443 0.4164 0.2177 0.36 0.544
1991 0.2696 0.5389 0.2695 0.36 0.308
1993 0.3636 0.6565 0.3385 0.36 0.388
1995 0.3462 0.6013 0.3127 0.36 0.400
1998 0.2887 0.5347 0.2723 0.37 0.462
2000 0.2768 0.4842 0.2502 0.37 0.386
Mexico 1984 0.7830 1.1422 0.6158 0.42 0.670
1989 0.8125 1.1561 0.6243 0.37 0.343
1992 0.9730 1.4735 0.7881 0.35 0.274
1994 1.0939 1.6377 0.8761 0.34 0.247
1996 0.9833 1.5178 0.8030 0.34 0.155
1998 0.9790 1.5476 0.8170 0.34 0.197
2000 0.7847 1.4187 0.7218 0.35 0.354
Netherlands 1983 0.2588 0.5594 0.2702 0.48 0.287
1994 0.1667 0.4012 0.2004 0.35 0.183
1999 0.2393 0.4698 0.2341 0.35 0.163
Spain 1995 0.3363 0.6973 0.3474 0.35 0.279
2000 0.2966 0.6217 0.3097 0.35 0.352
Sweden 1995 0.0756 0.3318 0.1816 0.28 0.220
Switzerland 1992 0.1824 0.4050 0.2050 0.10 0.134
United States 1979 0.2536 0.4896 0.2435 0.46
1991 0.4710 0.8955 0.4406 0.34
1997 0.4817 0.9139 0.4485 0.35
2000 0.4560 0.9108 0.4552 0.35
a. These values are estimated coefficients from the following regression that was run separately
for each country/year: 
b. These values are estimated coefficients from the following regression that was run separately
for each country/year:
Table 9: Mean Country Returns to Education
2
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Figure 5: Correlation Between Returns to Education and the Average Corporate Tax Rate
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Return to Return to Overall
Middle High Return  to
Education Education Education
Average Corporate Tax Rate -0.3122 -0.4451 * -0.2704 **
(.226) (.253) (.137)
Openness 0.0499 -0.0151 -0.0031
(.0434) (.0896) (.038)
(Openness - Mean Open)*Corp. Tax Rate -0.2000 0.1153 -0.0408
(.3113) (.550) (.267)
Ln(GDP per Capita) -0.4327 *** -0.6051 *** -0.3181 ***
(.093) (.112) (.0633)
Year 0.0063 *** 0.0089 * 0.0050 **
(.002) (.005) (.002)
Constant -7.9989 ** -11.2765 -6.5895 *
(3.775) (8.602) (3.922)
R-Squared 0.8782 0.8784 0.8863
N 3 83 83 8
Notes: All regressions include random effects and standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.



















 Appendix A: Derivation of Mathematical Results 
 
Three-Level Nested CES Production Function 
 
Production function with 4 inputs:  
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Marginal productivity of labor skill-level  3:        
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Ifβ γθ ==, a change in capital will not affect the ratio of wages between skill types. Thus, 
wages across skill will be affected similarly by a change in the corporate tax rate. 
 
Ifβ γθ >>, a change in capital increases the ratio of wages between L1 and L2 and the ratio 
of wages between L2 and L3. If L1 is high-skill labor, L2 is middle-skill labor and L3 is low-
skill labor and the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis holds, a change in capital should 
have the largest effect on high-skill labor. Thus, a change in the corporate tax rate is 
predicted to have the largest impact on the wages of high-skill workers.   44
Appendix B: Measures of Openness and Their Effect on Gross Wage 
 
(Exports + Imports)/
Warwick Sachs-Warner Chinn-Ito GDP
Australia 1994 0.135 1 2.656628 39.31
Austria 1994 0.18 1 2.374504 73.4
1997 0.22 1 2.656628 85.24
2000 0.312 1 2.656628 101.22
Belgium 1985 0.365 1 0.64974 141.49
1988 0.355 1 0.64974 132.65
1992 0.56 1 2.656628 130.38
1995 0.376 1 2.656628 133.73
1997 0.478 1 2.374504 144.83
2000 0.917 1 2.374504 169.33
Denmark 1987 0.139 1 -0.05699 60.71
1992 0.197 1 2.656628 66.43
Finland 1995 0.142 1 2.656628 66.16
2000 0.275 1 2.656628 76.03
France 1984 0.174 1 -0.05699 46.95
1989 0.181 1 -0.05699 44.36
1994 0.172 1 2.656628 41.63
Germany 1984 0.174 1 57.27
1989 0.188 1 56.52
1994 0.175 1 46.84
2000 0.253 1 67.07
Greece 1995 0.116 1 -0.05699 42.56
2000 0.171 1 1.342698 57.91
Ireland 1994 0.247 1 2.09238 131.67
1995 0.268 1 2.374504 141.23
1996 0.267 1 2.656628 143.46
2000 0.949 1 2.656628 175.56
Italy 1986 0.138 1 -0.05699 38.38
1987 0.138 1 -0.05699 37.85
1989 0.147 1 -0.05699 39.54
1991 0.151 1 0.507263 37.11
1993 0.174 1 2.374504 41.26
1995 0.175 1 2.656628 50
1998 0.219 1 2.656628 49.36
2000 0.207 1 2.656628 55.59
Luxembourg 1997 222.25
2000 285.59
Mexico 1984 0.147 0 -1.22844 32.24
1989 0.151 1 -0.76088 38.06
1992 0.158 1 -0.05699 35.51
1994 0.156 1 1.246007 38.48
1996 0.187 1 1.246007 62.26
1998 0.184 1 1.246007 63.52
2000 0.188 1 1.246007 64.69
Netherlands 1983 0.229 1 2.656628 108.04
1991 0.238 1 2.656628 104.71
1994 0.228 1 2.656628 103.7
1999 0.418 1 2.656628 116.85
Norway 1986 0.164 1 -0.05699 72.85
1991 0.15 1 -0.05699 72.62
1995 0.148 1 1.528131 70.1
2000 0.224 1 2.656628 77.05
Poland 1995 0.17 1 48.39
Slovak Republic 1992 138.62
Spain 1990 0.144 1 -0.05699 35.6
1995 0.162 1 1.810255 45.39
2000 0.25 1 1.810255 62.22
Sweden 1992 0.145 1 1.246007 54.42
1995 0.208 1 2.09238 74.13
2000 0.254 1 2.656628 89.02
Switzerland 1992 0.211 1 67.87
United States 1979 1 2.656628 18.94
1986 0.153 1 2.656628 17.51
1991 0.157 1 2.656628 20.64
1994 0.163 1 2.656628 21.99
1997 0.179 1 2.656628 24.5
2000 0.187 1 2.656628 26.2
Table B1: Openness Measures
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Warwick Chinn-Ito (exports+imports)/gdp
(I) (II) (III)
Marginal Corporate Tax Rate -0.9129 *** 0.2526 -0.7136 **
(.342) (.845) (.364)
Openness -2.1977 *** -0.2911 * -1.3769 ***
(.335) (.177) (.384)
(Open - Mean Open)*Corp. Tax 4.659 *** 0.8503 * 2.697 **
(.913) (.467) (1.06)
Low Education -0.7411 *** -0.729 *** -0.7421 ***
(.166) (.175) (.164)
Middle Education -0.3382 *** -0.3053 *** -0.3398 ***
(.038) (.031) (.039)
Age -0.0625 0.1929 -0.0915
(.374) (.359) (.397)
Age-Squared 0.0014 -0.0017 0.0018
(.005) (.005) (.005)
Male 0.1222 -0.1063 0.1072
(.209) (.284) (.192)
Ln(GDP per Capita) 0.8903 *** 0.685 0.9894 ***
(.124) (.120) (.107)
Year -0.0168 *** -0.0174 ** -0.0177 ***
(.004) (.009) (.004)
Constant 36.083 34.142 * 37.865 ***
(11.198) (18.438) (12.105)
R-Squared 0.7838 0.6506 0.7707
N 189 174 195
Notes: All regressions include random effects and standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.
Table B2: The Effect of Different Measures of Openness
on Ln(Gross Wage)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 